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I. Juridictional Statement 
1. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h), as this is an appeal from the district court involving 
domestic relations. Appellant appeals the trial court's Second Revised Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Revised Decree of Divorce. 
II. Statement of the Issues 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Divorce 
Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by holding 
that marital contracts are to be held to the same standard as common 
contracts? 
a. STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of Discretion: The trial court is afforded 
broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), and its determination will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kat% v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
Russell v. Martelk 681 P.2d 1193,1194 (Utah 1984). 
b. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES OR CASES: "Contracts between 
spouses or potential spouses are not necessarily judged on the same 
terms as contracts executed by persons operating at ""arm's length/" Reese 
p. Reese, 984 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1999). Duress, fraud, and coercion are 
commonly held sufficient to vacate a settlement in a divorce decree. See 
St. "Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982). 
Public interest requires that no spouse be defrauded by the other in 
obtaining a decree of divorce, and when properly pleaded, it is not 
important whether the decree is entered after litigation or if it is based 
on consent. Bayles v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah App. 1999). See also 
Birch v. Birch, 11\ P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that martial contracts and common contracts are held to 
the same standards for invalidation, did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
finding that the evidence put forward by the Appellant/Respondent failed to 
do so? 
a. STANDARD OF REVIEW: De Novo: Conclusions of law in civil cases are 
reviewed for correctness. As used by Utah's appellate courts, 
"correctness" means that no particular deference is given to the trial 
court's ruling on questions of law. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 
(Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 1998). 
b. DUTHRMIN/Yin 'l\ V'//|/K/7!AP R( U Ji\ OK OI.WiA, \\ lien t Ic^i! ml< "o 
k e applied to a given set of facts., oi in < iilicr w i »ixls w lien (In iii.il i ,m 
must determine "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of 
a given rule of law," the trial court is given a de facto grant of discretion. 
The stat ida iird c f re K ie\i approxii iiatc s a ' :de t \o\ o" review by the 
appellate cour ts State v. Pen \ • 869 P 2< I 932 : 936 38 (I Jl \ \ h 1994). 
HI. Determinative Rules 
1 E 1 de 60 c £ tii. = I Jta h R ules of Ci\ il I Procedure is attached as Exl libit i V 
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t l lSc iuSC |. .| (II, p i l ! | , « , u ' I lili 1il|" J i l i l i l k | U i l i l l ( In u l l u i p i l l l y \\\\i 
actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that r. \^v " '! ay lor v. Gas or 
I n c , 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980) 
\ :, -utement (Second, wi Contracts, §§ i/..• «UK» I •• dciinmgDuress are 
I J , , ! . . • 
4. fhe U tah Supreme Court has "explicidy adoptfed] the legal standards 
set forth in sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts." 
i Vfidrem v. Hur tg ren 8(>o r „K\ 916, 921 (Utah 1993). 
6 
IV. Statement of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn presiding. 
The parties were divorced on June 7, 2004. The decree was entered into by a 
stipulation agreement On July 12, 2004 the Appellant ("Melanie") filed a motion 
seeking to set aside the divorce decree under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
A hearing on the motion took place on November 10, 2004. At this hearing 
Judge Quinn denied the motion. The final order was entered on December 6, 2004 
and Melanie filed a Notice of Appeal on January 3, 2005. 
V. Statement of the Facts 
1. Parties were married on May 7, 1993 and had three children as issue of their 
marriage. 
2. The parties separated in April 2004 when Appellee ordered Appellant to move 
out of their marital home Tr. at 15. 
3. During the course of their marriage, Appellant felt that Appellee exherted 
extreme control. Tr. at 15. This behavior was also observed by numerous 
close and professional contacts. See Wells Aff f^ 3-7; Dr. Langer Aff; Williams 
Afff 3,12; Bills Aff t 1-3. 
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4. Appellee was observed to be relendessly critical of most things the Appellant 
did. This criticism was applied to everything from Appellant's carrying out of 
household functions to cooking to caring for the children. See Respondent 
Aff 13; BfflsAf£t 1 - 2 , 9 . 
5. This created an environment where the Appellant felt that "nothing was ever 
good enough" for the Appellee. Resp't Aff f 3. 
6. This controlling attitude came to a head during the period preceding the 
divorce. The Appellee forced Appellant to leave the marital house (Resp't Aff 
1 8) and started calling her at work to such an extent that the Appellant was 
reprimanded by her employer. Tr. at 15. 
7. While Appellant was out of the marital home, Appellee would show up at 
Appellant's residence and go through her closets and drawers. He also checked 
calls on her cell phone and placed calls to numbers found in her cell phone. 
Verified Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the 
Decree of Divorce pg. 3. 
8. This created the emotional framework evident during the divorce proceedings. 
The Appellant felt that she had no choice but to agree to the Appellee's 
demands and was not aware that other options were available to her. Tr. at 14: 
7-10,20-15:1. 
9. The Appellee dictated the terms of the stipulation to the Appellant and then 
forced her to fax the statement to the Appellee's attorney, Mr. Tycksen. Tr. at 
15: 13-22. 
10. Appellee told Appellant that she had no other choice but to sign the stipulation 
document or else she would go to jail and would never see her children again. 
Verified Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the 
Decree of Divorce pg. 2. 
11. These threats were based on the Appellant's previous felony plea and prison 
correspondence. Appellant found these threats credible and caused substantial 
fear and apprehension through the ongoing manipulation and control of her 
husband. 
12. Based upon these threats and coercions the Appellant's will was overcome and 
as a result she submitted and later signed the stipulation documents. Id 
13. The Appellee hired Mr. Tycksen to represent him during the divorce 
proceedings. Appellee told the Appellant that she could not retain independent 
counsel as they could not afford two attorneys. Resp't Aff. f 8. 
14. The Appellee required the Appellant to pay half of the attorney's fees. Resp't 
Aff. Tf 8. This lead Appellant to believe that both parties' interests were 
represented by Mr. Tycksen and that he would ensure the fairness of the 
process. Tr 13:11-18,14:11-16;. 
15. Mr. Tycksen has stated that he offered legal advice to both of the parties 
during their meetings together. Tr. at 21:15-16. 
16. During these meetings, while the Appellant believed that she was being 
represented by Mr. Tycksen, Mr. Tycksen made several representations of 
questionable validity to the Appellant. He told her that the stipulation was a 
"really good deal/' Tr. at 12:19-22. He also told her that while arrangements 
for child support were required by law, the Appellee would not enforce them, 
and even if he chose to later enforce the provision he could only "go back one 
month." Tr. 12:23-13:10. 
17. It wasn't until the last meeting, either immediately before or after the signing of 
the stipulation, that Mr. Tycksen informed the Appellant that he only 
represented the Appellee and that she could get her own attorney to review the 
stipulation. Tr. 13:23-14:4. 
18. By this point, Appellant was confused by the issues of representation and felt 
rushed into a decision. She stated that "it happened so fast and went so quickly 
that I didn't know what to do. I didn't have the money to find my own 
attorney" having paid for half of Mr. Tycksen's charges already. Tr. at 14:5-10. 
19. There is no language in the stipulation or the decree that clarifies that appellant 
understands that Mr. Tycksen only represents the Appellee or that she 
understood or had been informed of her right to seek counsel. 
20. The parties were divorced pursuant to the written stipulation on June 7, 2004. 
Pursuant to the decree, the Appellee was awarded the marital home, on which 
Appellant was awarded an equitable lien of $20,000. Appellee was also awarded 
the neighboring lot free and clear of any claim. Both properties were gifted to 
the Appellant as part of her inheritance. Appellee had contributed 
approximately $20,000 of his pre-marital assets to the cost of building the 
marital home. 
21. Appellant also gave over custody of her children and agreed to a visitation 
schedule that was she felt was highly disadvantageous. She agreed to the terms 
based on the threats, coercions and representations discussed above. 
22. On July 12, 2004 Appellant, having realized the unfair nature of the 
proceedings and stipulation, moved the lower court to set aside the decree 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
23. During the hearing, the Honorable Anthony Quinn stated, "[UJltimately, the 
terms of this divorce appear on the face of it to be one-sided." Tr. at 3:9-12. 
However, he denied the Appellant's 60(b) motion. 
24. Appellant now appeals the lower court's ruling. 
VI. Summary of the Argument 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DECREE PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE BY DECLARING THAT MARRIAGE 
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CONTRACTS MUST MEET THE SAME STANDARDS FOR INVALIDATION 
AS "COMMON" CONTRACTS. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to relieve a 
party from a final judgment or proceeding for the following reasons applicable to this 
case: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 
(3) Fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of adverse party 
or; 
(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
judgment. 
The lower court, in denying Melanie's motion to set aside the decree, concluded 
that Melanie "must, at a minimum, produce evidence that would constitute a defense 
to a common contract." (Minute entry conclusions, f 1). This conclusion, however, 
is direcdy contrary to Utah common law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "contracts between spouses or potential 
spouses are not necessarily judged on the same terms as contracts executed by persons 
operating at 'arm's length/" Reese v. Reese. 984 P.2d 987 (Utah 1999). Reese held, in 
the context of prenuptial agreements, "the mutual trust between the parties raises an 
expectation that each party will act in the other's best interest The closeness of this 
relationship, however, also renders it particularly susceptible to abuse." Id. While 
mutual trust is a lesser issue in a divorce proceeding, the closeness of the relationship 
and intimate history makes marital agreements prone to abuse. This suggests that 
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when evaluating duress, fraud or the fairness of contracts in a marriage a lesser 
standard is to be employed than that used in "common contracts." 
II. ASSUMING. ARGUENDO. THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACT IS HELD TO 
THE SAME STANDARD AS A COMMON CONTRACT. THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PUT FORWARD BY THE 
APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE STANDARDS FOR INVALIDATION. 
While "[ejquity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily 
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain made/' Land v. 
Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980), the present case is not simply one of regret. 
The stipulation created and signed was the product of fraud and duress and is so one 
sided and unfair that the court should exercise their considerable discretion to set 
aside the stipulation. 
Fraud 
Appellee denied Melanie access to legal counsel to advise her of the equity of 
her divorce settlement. This amounts to fraud, as declared by the Utah Supreme 
Court in St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982). Appellee told 
Melanie that it was enough to have one attorney between them. He also told Melanie 
that they could only afford one attorney and that each of them should pay half of the 
expenses, which she did. Therefore, when dealing with Mr. Tycksen, the counsel 
retained by the Appellee, Melanie believed that her interests were being looked after 
by Mr. Tycksen, a conclusion supported by (1) her payment of half of his bill, (2) 
assertions made by Mr. Tycksen about the fairness of the deal and (3) the fact that Mr. 
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Tycksen did not inform Melanie of his true representative relationship until 
immediately before or after signing the divorce stipulation. 
Duress 
Melanie had endured Appellee's controlling and manipulative nature through 
almost 11 years of marriage. He improperly threatened her that if she failed to follow 
his instructions with the creation and signing of the divorce agreement that she would 
end up in jail and never see her children again. This had a dramatic impact on 
Melanie's ability to negotiate and agree to a fair divorce settlement. 
Equity 
The courts have the power to set aside divorce decrees, even ones reached by 
stipulation, if they find that the arrangements are unfair. The trial judge observed the 
one sidedness of the arrangement. It now behooves this court to exercise thier 
discretion to set aside this blatantly one sided and unfair decree and allow what 
"justice and equity require for the interest and welfare of the parties involved." Mathie 
v. Mathie. 363 P.2d 779, 782-83 (Utah 1961). 
VII. Argument 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DECREE PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE BY DECLARING THAT MARRIAGE 
CONTRACTS MUST MEET THE SAME STANDARDS FOR INVALIDATION 
AS "ARM'S-LENGTH" CONTRACTS 
A. Rule 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that "contracts between spouses or potential 
spouses are not necessarily judged on the same terms as contracts executed by persons 
operating at 'arm's length.'" Reese v. Reese. 984 P.2d 987 (Utah 1999). In the context 
of prenuptial agreements, for instance, "the mutual trust between the parties raises an 
expectation that each party will act in the other's best interest. The closeness of this 
relationship, however, also renders it particularly susceptible to abuse." Id. While 
"mutual trust" is not as prevalent in a divorce proceeding as it may be in a prenuptial 
arrangement, the closeness of the relationship, history and spousal knowledge 
continue to make this type of agreement dangerously "susceptible to abuse." 
While the exact standards to be used when judging marital contracts is 
not clear1, it is apparent that the Utah Supreme Court had intended it to be a lesser 
standard than the "arm's length" transaction standards relied upon by opposing 
counsel. 
B. Application 
In analyzing the arguments in the following sections, they must be looked at in 
the framework of the above rule. That is, Marriage Contracts are not arm's length 
transactions and this should be taken into heavy consideration as applied to the 
arguments laid out below. 
In this case, the Appellee had years of experience controlling Melanie's 
behaviors. As her husband, the Appellee was able to exert a level of authority and 
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control that is not present in an arm's length transaction. Melanie has testified about 
this control, as have others who have witnessed the manipulations first hand. In 
addition, Melanie did not have the luxury that is available with most arm's length 
transactions. She could not just walk away if she found the terms unfavorable. The 
Appellee had threatened that Melanie would lose her children and be sent to jail if she 
did not do as he told her. This obviously creates a scenario that would not be present 
if one were simply buying a car or entering into other "Common contracts." This is a 
contract, by its very nature, that is "particularly susceptible to abuse." 
II. ASSUMING. ARGUENDO. THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACT IS HELD TO 
THE SAME STANDARD AS AN ARMS-LENGTH CONTRACT. THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PUT FORWARD BY 
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE STANDARDS FOR 
INVALIDATION. 
A. Rule: Standards for Contract Invalidation 
1. Fraud 
III. Courts have long found fraud to be an allowable reason for contract invalidation. 
Fraud is characterized as a false representation or an omitted representation (with a 
duty to disclose) made for the purpose of inducing action which is reasonable relied 
upon and results in damage. Taylor v. Gasor Inc.. 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980). 
Beyond this classic definition, which is applicable to this case on several levels, fraud 
takes on an additional meaning in divorce cases. 
1
 The court having declined to rule on the subject in In Re Beesley. 883 P.2d 1343, Fn 
6 (Utah 1994). 
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"An intentional act by a party in a divorce action which prevents 
the opposing party from making a full defense "amounts to fraud 
upon the opposing party, as well as upon justice, justifying court 
in setting aside the decree so obtained/" St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 
645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982) (Citations omitted.). 
It also takes on an additional character when it relates to dual representation of 
clients in a divorce case. The Utah State Bar has issued the formal opinion that an 
attorney may not concurrendy represent both parties in a divorce under any 
circumstances. Opinion No. 116, June 25,1992. "The risk of the appearance of 
impropriety is great in divorce cases where the inherent adversity of the parties is so 
obvious.... [D]ual representation can foster actual impropriety by facilitating a fraud 
on the court, either with or without the attorney's collusion. The potential for fraud 
enlarges when one spouse dominates in the marriage." Id. 
When discussing arguments that have been advanced in favor of dual 
representation, the Bar points out that, while someone should be allowed to waive 
their right to separate representation, this assumes that both parties are equally 
informed as to advantages and disadvantages of dual representation. However, "[tjhat 
assumption is not valid when one party dominates to the extent of controlling the 
other party's power to decide.... Such dominance is often the case in dissolving 
marriages and may not be apparent to the attorney who only sees both parties when 
they are together." Id-
1. Duress 
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When dealing with traditional arm's length contracts, Utah has "explicitly adopt[ed] 
the legal standards of duress set forth in sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conracts." Andreini v. Hurtgren 860 P.2d 916. 921 (Utah 1993). The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts allows for two types of duress that may invalidate 
a contract: duress by physical compulsion and duress by improper threat The 
sections on duress by improper threat, sections 175 and 176, read, in applicable part, 
as follows: 
§175: When Duress By Threat Makes A Contract Voidable 
(1) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by 
the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 
contract is voidable by the victim. 
§176: When A Threat is Improper 
(1) A threat is improper if 
a. What is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would 
be a crime or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property, 
b. What is threatened is criminal prosecution, 
c. What is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is 
made in bad faith, or 
d. The threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
under a contract with the recipient 
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and 
a. The threatened act would harm the recipient and would not 
significandy benefit the party making the threat, 
b. The effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of 
assent is significandy increased by prior unfair dealing by the 
party making the threat, or 
c. What is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate 
ends. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "Duress and fraud are commonly held 
sufficient to vacate a property settlement in a divorce decree." St. Pierre at 619. This 
is true because 'Tublic interest requires that no spouse be defrauded or coerced by the 
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other in obtaining a decree of divorce/' Id. "Generally speaking, the courts will, as in 
the case of fraud ... exercise their power and set aside a judgment obtained by 
duress/' Id. 
This is vitally true in marital contract negotiations. There is such a risk for 
abuse and heavy-handed dealing that courts have to ensure that the dealings are fair 
and the outcomes equitable. "[T]he general principal derived from our case law is that 
spouses or prospective spouses may make binding contracts with each other and 
arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the negotiations are conducted in good faith ... 
and do not unreasonably constrain the court}s equitable and statutory duties" Reese. 994-995, 
Emphasis added. In Reese, the court had found that, while there was evidence that 
Thomas had exerted some pressure by repeatedly requesting that Sheila sign the 
contract, this did not constitute a clear lack of good faith, honesty, and candor. 
However, in the present case, there was a demonstrated history of Appellee 
controlling and manipulating Melanie. 
2. Public Policy 
The courts have wide discretionary power in ensuring that divorce agreements 
are fair and that public policy is not violated by an overly dominant or unfair decree. 
Public interest requires that no spouse be defrauded by the other in obtaining a decree 
of divorce and, when properly pleaded, it is not important whether the decree is 
entered after litigation or based on consent. Bayles v. Bayles. 981 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah 
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App. 1999). See also Birch v. Bitch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). Equity has 
often been used by the Utah Supreme Court to allow for the invalidation of one-sided 
decrees, including the following cases: 
It is the established rule that a stipulation pertaining to 
matters of divorce, custody and property rights therein, 
though advisory upon the court and would usually be 
followed unless the court thought it unfair or unreasonable, 
is not necessarily binding on the court anyway. It is only a 
recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to 
be fair and reasonable. Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 
(Utah 1975). 
We also have been unwilling to deprive trial courts of their 
equitable powers to modify agreements made by spouses in 
contemplation of divorce. c[A]greements between spouses 
to fix their property rights ... are generally not held to be 
so absolute as to prevent a court under its equity powers in 
divorce actions from doing that which justice and equity 
require for the interest and welfare of the parties involved. 
Id , citing Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779, 782-83 (Utah 
1961). 
Therefore, the trial court should only look at a stipulation as a 
recommendation. If a trial court finds it to be one-sided, the trial court should not 
adhere to it, but should rather set it aside in the interests of equity. 
B. Application 
1. Fraud 
Appellee prevented Melanie from obtaining counsel to assist her during the 
divorce proceedings. He represented that they could not afford a second attorney and 
that she would not need independent representation. This assertion was made to 
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prevent Melanie from obtaining counsel that would ensure equitable proceedings. 
This assertion was reasonably believed and relied upon by Melanie to her detriment. 
Having personal representation is usually an integral part of making a full defense. As 
noted above, the intentional act of preventing a party from making a full defense 
amounts to fraud in itself. 
Melanie was further a victim of the Appellee's fraudulent behavior as a result of 
representations he made to her that caused her to take detrimental actions. Appellee 
told Melanie that the courts would deny her all custody and visitation rights to her 
children as a result of her time in prison. He told her that the only way that she could 
secure even limited visitation was to agree to the terms he was establishing. These 
statements, which amount to duress as examined below, also amount to fraud in that 
they were false material statements which Melanie relied upon to her detriment. Her 
being denied access to legal counsel which could have corrected the representation 
makes her reliance reasonable. 
Melanie was also misled by representations that were not made in a timely 
fashion, but should have been. By paying half of the attorney's fees and by 
representation made by Appellee and his attorney, Melanie believed that that an 
attorney was unnecessary as her interests would be protected by the counsel retained 
by the Appellee. This representation was not corrected by Appellee or Appellee's 
counsel until their last meeting together. Melanie testified that she believed Mr. 
Tycksen, Appellee's counsel, was equally advising both parties. Melanie reasonably 
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prevent Melanie from obtaining counsel that would ensure equitable proceedings. 
This assertion was reasonably believed and relied upon by Melanie to her detriment. 
Having personal representation is usually an integral part of making a full defense. As 
noted above, the intentional act of preventing a party from making a full defense 
amounts to fraud in itself. 
Melanie was further a victim of the Appellee's fraudulent behavior as a result of 
representations he made to her that caused her to take detrimental actions. Appellee 
told Melanie that the courts would i leny her all custody and visitation rights to her 
children as a result of her conviction. He told her that the only way that she could 
secure even limited visitation was to agree to the terms he was establishing. These 
statements, which amount to duress as examined below, also amount to fraud in that 
they were false material statements which Melanie relied upon to her detriment. Her 
being denied access to legal counsel which could have corrected the representation 
makes her reliance reasonable. 
Melanie was also misled by representations that were not made in a timely 
fashion, but should have been. By paying half of the attorney's fees and by 
representation made by Appellee and his attorney, Melanie believed tlul that an 
attorney was unnecessary as her interests would be protected by the counsel retained 
by the Appellee. This representation was not corrected by Appellee or Appellee's 
counsel until ilir n last meeting together. Melanie testified th.il Jie believed Mr. 
Tycksen, Appellee's counsel, was equally advising both parties. Melanie reasonably 
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believ eel that A ppellee's com isel w as protecting both pa t tie s3 ii iterests while preparing 
the stipulation and the resulting findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of 
divorce. 
Melanie's belief and reliance was reasonable because (1) she paid for half of the 
expenses, (2) M: Tycksen advised botl i parties and n la de representations a boi it: the 
agreeixiei it at id, (3) Melanie was not notified, in writing or during meetings with 
Appellee and Mr. Tycksen, that she was not being represented until immediately 
before or after the signing of the stipulation. Each of these points is explored below. 
(1) Appellee hired an attorney and informed Mrlatue dial ihere was in » money 
for at I jiJilifiK »ful attorney and that she was to pay one-half of the attorney's fees, or 
$700, which she did. After the numerous years under the control of Appellee and 
being dominated by his wishes, Melanie was once again dominated by Appellee. She 
followed his instructions, not knowing any better. She also believed I liai this would 
ensure thai Mi "Tycksen would IK pn fit t dug her interests as well as Appellee's. 
(2) This belief was furthered by the representations Mr. Tycksen made to her 
during the process. He referred to the fairness of the property distribution and of the 
visitation arrangements. Mr. Tycksen also, by his own admission, advised both parties 
aboi it t! le child support pro\ isions i lecessary to i i lake tl leir a rrangements valid 
Appellee falsely represented to Melanie that he would not enforce the child support 
provision. Mr. Tycksen then told Melanie that even if the Appellee later decided to 
enforce the provision, he could only go back one month. Leaving aside the legal 
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incorrectness of this representation for a moment, it supports the claim that Mr. 
Tycksen was holding himself out as representing Melanie's interests. This furthered 
Melanie's belief that she was being adequately represented. 
Addressing the legal incorrectness of this representation, Mr. Tycksen is 
operating from a superior position of knowledge regarding the law. His 
representation about the Appellee's ability to only go after back child support for one 
month was clearly incorrect. Melanie relied upon this incorrect representation in 
agreeing to sign the document. She relied upon his representation because she was 
under the impression that Mr. Tycksen would not give her blatandy incorrect 
information. 
(3) Finally, this belief was reasonable because nothing was ever given or told to 
her that would dissuade her from that belief until the last meeting. Nothing in the 
stipulation, the findings, or the decree stated anything about Mr. Tycksen only 
representing Appellee, or about Melanie being informed of her right to seek separate 
counsel. This is standard language. In fact, Melanie was not informed until the 
signing of the stipulation that she was not represented by Mr. Tycksen at all and that 
she could have another attorney look at the stipulation. At that point, sitting next to 
her controlling and domineering husband, struggling to cope with and understand this 
last minute revelation, she could not be expected to reasonably appreciate or assert 
her rights. This would be equivalent to the police interrogating a suspect to the very 
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poii it of confessioi 1 at id 1:1 lei m jn ist before or after signing the: confession, inforn ung 
them of their Miranda rights. 
Mr. Tycksen was, in effect, acting as a dual representative of the parties during 
the divorce proceedings, especially in the mind of Melanie. She entered into the 
stipulation after being told repeatedly by Appellee that she had i 10 el loice, and a iter 
Mr. Tycksen had informed her that she was getting a "good deal." Melanie thought 
that she could trust Mr. Tycksen to be fair and look out for her interests as well. 
The present case is a prime example of the kind of situation the Bar expressed 
concern about. Appellee was clearly the dominant party in the marriage. Appellee 
dictated many aspects of Melanie's life, everything from who her friends were to how 
household chores were completed. Throughout their marriage, Appellee controlled 
the relationship and insisted on having everything his way. This relationship finally 
manifested itself by creating the circumstances that allowed the Appellee to convince 
Melanie that she could 1 tot a i id shoi ild i lot coi itact a la w yer 01 i her ow i 1, "u hich alone 
amounts to fraud. 
2. Duress 
As was stated in Appellee's affidavit and that of his attorney, the terms of the 
divorce were arrived a t prior to approaching Appellee's attorney to draft the papers. • 
This was done under the Appellee's influence. After so many years of being 
dominated by Appellee, this compilation of terms was not the result of a fair 
discussion. Rather, it was the result of coercion, threats and unfair practices. Among 
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other things, Appellee told Melanie that the stipulation was her only choice; otherwise 
she would go to jail and would never see her children again. She was not allowed to 
hire an attorney on her own to offer a correct perspective to counter his threats, so 
she believed that carrying out his wishes was the only way to avoid incarceration and a 
permanent separation from her kids. He added credibility by demonstrating his level 
of control over her and his commitment to dominating her life. During their 
separation, the Appellee would show up at Melanie's residence and go through her 
closets and drawers. He also checked calls on her cell phone and placed calls to 
numbers found in her cell phone. 
Melanie has stated that she signed the stipulation as a direct result.of these 
threats and controlling actions. She was also acting under the fear of these threats 
when she typed the stipulation and faxed it to Mr. Tycksen's office. Nothing is as 
important to Melanie as her children and she believed that she would never see them 
again if she took a course of action contrary to Appellee's desires. 
Fearing for the loss of her children and her freedom from an improper threat 
she deemed credible and avoidable only by conforming to Appellee's wishes, the 
circumstances of this stipulation's creation and signing fall squarely within the state 
adopted definition of duress discussed on page 18. Under fear of criminal 
prosecution and abuse of civil process Melanie signed this document. 
3. Public Policy 
25 
I h lblic interest requires th;i( no '-.p^ usc" l>c defrauded l>\ I he olhcf ID obtaining a 
decree of divorce. Public interest also requires that divorce decrees be fair, especially 
to avoid abuse by a dominant spouse. In this case, the Appellee received an unfair 
distribution of property in the decree. As part of the decree, Melanie conveyed to 
Appellee land that was given to her l>v her father. It was an early distributioi 1 of 1 ler 
it il: leritai ice and a as intei ide d to pass to Melanie specifically. This inherited property 
was not part of the marital estate. Generally, courts should "award property acquired 
by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage ... to that spouse ... unless 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to tlle 
e t ihai icei nent, i i: iaii itenai ice, or protection of that property, tl lereby acquiring an 
equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of 
an interest therein to the other spouse." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P 2J • >-. >j '8 
(Utal i 1988). 
The land that was subject to the real property division in the instant case was 
inherited by Melanie. The gift was of 1.92 acres of undeveloped land, worth an 
estimated $70,000. Appellee did contribute approximately $20,000 of his funds to 
bi iild a house oi I a por tioi i of the property,, wl lie! 1 beca n le tl le n larita 1 hoi r le Appellee 
did acquire some amount of equitable interest in the land, however, he convinced 
Melanie that she had little claim in the property due to his investment, and that he was 
entided to the retain possession of marital home and the property on which it stood. 
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According to the property distribution Melanie was induced to agree to, Melanie 
received a mere $20,000 equity lien on the home. Melanie also conveyed the 
remaining acreage to the Appellee free of any claim of interest. Appellee had not 
invested any personal assets to this parcel and would have no claim outside of this 
decree. 
While the property loss as a result of this decree is substantial, Melanie is most 
concerned about the consequences of this decree on her relationship with her 
children. This decree cost Melanie all claims to custody and is heavily weighted 
against her in visitation rights. Under the flag of equity Melanie challenges the 
fairness of the visitation schedule and requirements that the Appellee has placed on 
Melanie in the carrying out of that visitation schedule. The divorce decree requires 
that Melanie spend a significant portion of her time with the children at the Appellee's 
home rather than her own. Also, in the event that the Appellee needed someone to 
care for the children during his visitation time, Melanie was not offered the option to 
watch them, rather being replaced by the Appellee's mother in those circumstances. 
These children are the most important thing in Melanie's life. She would have 
never signed away her custody had it not been for the unfair and misleading dealings 
as discussed above. The blanket granting away of rights and access to her children 
demonstrate the one-sidedness of the dealings and the importance of a public policy 
that protects against such abuse. Because of the combination of fraud and threats, 
this divorce has been a one sided playing field since the beginning. When people are 
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unable to adequate]..]/ protect their rights, for whate\ er reasoi i bi it especially when 
dealing w ith pa rties it i. adv antageous positions, the courts have an interest to see that 
people are treated fairly and with dignity. 
Courts have wide discretion to set aside divorce decrees, even ones arrived at 
by genuine stipulation, if the court finds that the decree is imfair. Divorce and 
a is tody stipulations are only "recomn let idation[s] to be adhered to if the court believes it 
to be fair and reasonable'' Klein at 476, emphasis added. In this case, the trial court 
judge stated on record that it's an inequitable decree: "[U]ltimately, the terms of this 
divorce appear on the face of it to be one-sided." (transcript p. 3). Having made the 
deteti i linatiot 1 tl: la t it \\ as one sided, 1:1: :i.e tria I. ji icige erred in holding that lie then had to 
look for contract reasons to invalidate the decree. Based on the one-sidedness of the 
stipulation, the trial judge could have, and it is Melanie's assertion that he should have, 
used his equitable powers to set it aside without further justification. 
VIII. Conclusion and Prayer 
This case is before the court as a challenge to the court's denial of a motion to 
set aside a divorce decree under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court held that marriage contracts could only be set aside if they met the 
standards required to set aside "arm's lei lgtl I" coi ltracts The coi irt tl len foi tiid tl ia t 
those standards were not met It is established case law that marriage contracts are 
not "arm's length" contracts, but are more prone toward abuse from a controlling 
spouse, so the standards must be different than those of a typical contract. 
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However, assuming arguendo that the standards for marriage contracts and 
"common" contracts are the same, the trial court erred in finding that these standards 
had not been met. This is a case where duress and fraud culminated to deny Melanie 
an equitable division of property and, more importantly, parental custody and 
visitations. Fraud and duress were used to force Melanie to sign a decree that she 
never would have signed absent those improper forces and misrepresentations. Public 
policy demands that divorce decrees be equitable and the courts are only to adhere to 
recommendations, including stipulations, if the courts find that they are equitable. 
These factors, taken collectively and individually, create a scenario that demands 
invalidation of the decree. Melanie is only asking for a chance to reexamine the 
decree with the benefit of real counsel instead of being dominated and controlled by 
her husband and the representations of his attorney. 
Melanie prays this court to overturn the ruling of the trial court and asks that 
the divorce decree be set aside so that a new one may be fairly created. 
DATED THIS 24th day of August 2005. 
(A /o^-^-r^ 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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Exhibit 1: 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Exhibit 2: Restatement of Contracts (Second) §§175-176 
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Exhibit A 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; ext uvthic iri*h 11 new ly fii'iannieil evidence, fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgmen I iHtki 01 pioemlmg foi 1h 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovei ed in time to 
i der Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void, ( S) (lie |iidmmiM»l luv-s luxti satisfied ideased, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application oi (<>) HI\ olhti leuson 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months .illn tin 
judgmem, i >i < lei i i proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This i ule does not limit 
tl le povv er of a coi u t to entei tain an independent action to relieve, a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any irhH'iiom i nid^mnil dull bv by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Tab 2 
Exhibit B 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 175 When Duress by Threat Makes a Contract Voidable 
(1) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the 
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is 
voidable by the victim. 
(2) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a party to 
the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to 
the transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the duress either 
gives value or relies materially on the transaction. 
§ 176 When a Threat Is Improper 
(1) A threat is improper if 
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime 
or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property, 
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution, 
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad 
faith, or 
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a 
contract with the recipient. 
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and 
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significandy 
benefit the party making the threat, 
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is 
significandy increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or 
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends. 
